The Israel Defence Forces has admitted the attacks by Hamas on October 7 2023 were “a complete failure” of Israeli security and the result of many years of planning and deception by the Gaza-based militant group.
Announcing some of the findings from a major internal investigation, the Israeli military said “the IDF failed in its mission to protect people” and it was “one of the greatest failures” in the military’s history.
Nobody in the Israeli security establishment knew of, or predicted, the attacks and the force stationed on the border was the minimum required for everyday threats.
The primary focus at the time was on the threat from Iran and Hezbollah. The inquiry concluded that those actors were aware of Hamas’s plans but probably didn’t know the exact timing of the attacks.
Gaza was seen as a secondary threat and while Hamas was considered an illegitimate governing body of Gaza, there was no effort to develop an alternative.
The inquiry, which is the result of tens of thousands of hours of work by the IDF Southern Command, found as many as 5,600 terrorists broke into Israel in three waves.
On October 7 2023, 4,694 mortars and rockets were fired from Gaza into Israel, and 1,320 people were killed and 251 taken hostage.
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As the IDF battled to regain control of southern Israel the same day, some of its commanders were forced to use google maps and mobile phones to communicate and co-ordinate.
The majority of killings and kidnappings occurred during the first two waves of attacks, between 6.29am and 9am on that Saturday morning.
Many Palestinians who entered Gaza in the third wave, during the afternoon, were from other terror organisations or “a mob taking advantage” rather than Hamas fighters trained for the attack.
In the chaos, the Israeli air force struggled to distinguish between Hamas fighters and Israeli civilians. The IDF accepts there were some deaths caused by friendly fire but haven’t elaborated how or where.
By 5pm, there were still hundreds of Hamas fighters spread out along the so-called Gaza envelope of Israeli communities, many in open areas.
It’s thought they planned to reach deeper into Israel, including Ashkelon and key air bases.
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Intelligence assessments at the time believed that Hamas didn’t want a full-scale war and lacked the capability to launch one. IDF officials believed there would be early warnings if an attack was imminent, and the strategy was to “maintain the threat” rather than neutralise it.
Based on that, officials said soldiers “were addicted to the precise intelligence information” and failed to challenge the assumptions internally.
Although there were some unusual indications an attack was under way overnight, such as the activation of Israeli SIM cards inside Gaza, duty officers didn’t think it was time-critical and further investigation was needed.
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Hamas activity in a specific area was dismissed as a training exercise. After consultation with senior commanders in the middle of the night, it was decided to hold a situational assessment early in the morning. The attack happened before that took place.
The scale and brutality of the attack took the IDF by surprise and their defensive strategies, including a vastly expensive subterranean wall, proved ineffective. The barrier was designed to stop mass protests and limited infiltration but not a large-scale attack. Forces along the border had been reduced because of other requirements on the Lebanon border and in the West Bank, and the IDF had too much confidence in the barrier defences.
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Through various intelligence sources, including material found in Gaza, it’s now understood that Hamas’s leader at the time, Yahya Sinwar, first conceived the idea in November 2016. A plan to attack Israel was approved in July 2019.
During those years, Hamas deceived Israel, convincing leaders it wanted economic prosperity rather than conflict.
A short war between the two in 2021 didn’t inflict as much damage on Hamas infrastructure and capabilities as Israel believed.
Hamas was close to launching the attacks on three occasions during 2022 but decided not to for unknown reasons. They eventually did so to take advantage of a Jewish religious holiday in 2023.
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The inquiry has also compiled 41 separate findings of battles in specific kibbutzim, military bases and key roads. Those details are being presented to the individual communities over the coming days.
The Israeli government has repeatedly rejected calls for a State Commission of Inquiry, saying the time is not yet right because of the ongoing war.
Critics of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu say he is avoiding personal responsibility for his role as Israel’s leader at the time.
